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I. INTRODUCTION'
Digital sound sampling has revolutionized the music scene and
fostered ethical controversy, legal ambiguity, ad hoc industry prac-
tices, and a plethora of litigation and rancorous settlements. It also
poses "excruciatingly difficult legal and moral questions."2 Sam-
pling is a process whereby one can record, store, and manipulate
any sound, s either live or lifted from a previous recording. The
scope of uses is unlimited: a cooing dove; a Jimi Hendrix guitar
riff; the wind; the Beatles singing "She loves you, yeh, yeh, yeh;" a
footstep; a brassy horn. Any sound can be isolated and become
part of a new recording.' For example, sampling makes it possible
* B.A., 1990, Boston College; J.D., 1993, Hofstra University. Mr. Baroni currently
practices entertainment law in New York.
1. The author would like to thank Jeffrey E. Jacobson of Jacobson & Colfin, P.C., in
New York, who suggested the idea of a compulsory license for sampling, and Professor Leon
Friedman for his inspiration and supervision of this paper.
2. Curt Suplee, Snapshots of Sound, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1987, at C3.
3. Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection and Infringement in Today's Music
Industry, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 147 (1989).
4. Jon Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1986, at
C23, col. 4.
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to arrange a single recording featuring Madonna singing, Eric
Clapton on guitar, Phil Collins on drums, Louis Armstrong on
trumpet, and James Brown' screams as background vocals.' With
sampling, one can create a symphony of sound and an infinite
number of musical arrangements. The unauthorized sampling of
others' musical expression from copyrighted sound recordings has
developed into a prolific practice in modern pop and rap music.6
The two competing concerns surrounding sampling are piracy
and artistry. Some view sampling as pure theft, while others view
it as an indispensable tool for musical expression and develop-
ment." The piracy/artistry controversy represents a struggle be-
tween the rights of artists to control uses of their own work, and
the creative opportunities inherent in the new technology of sam-
pling. In sum, sampling is a "pirate's dream come true and a
nightmare for all the artists, musicians, engineers and record
manufacturers."9
Currently, a lack of definable standards exists for sampling
use and infringement. There is great uncertainty in the music in-
dustry concerning issues such as whether certain types of sampling
are legal, when to seek a license, and how much to pay for a given
use. Of the numerous cases to have been filed to date, all but one
are still pending or have been settled out of court,1" and the re-
5. Incidentally, James Brown may be "the most-stolen-from artist in show business"
because of sampling. Tom Moon, Music Sampling or Stealing: Who Owns the Sounds of
Music?, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 1988, at 3e.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
7. Producer Tome Lord-Alge, whose collection of over two thousand samples includes
Phil Collins playing drums and James Brown's screams, has stated, "[w]e're all blatantly
stealing from every one else ... [sic] That's just the way it's done in the '80s." Dick Weiss-
man, Music 1990: Examining Technology Issues, INT'L MUSICIAN, Dec. 1988, at 7, 18. Peter
Paterno, a music attorney representing Guns N' Roses, has stated, "I think every one of
those guys who samples is going to lose (in court)." John Horn, Borrowed Performances
May get Rappers in Trouble, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 7, 1989, at lB. The late Frank
Zappa thought sampling was pure theft, and had inserted a "no sampling" clause into the
standard copyright infringement notice printed on his albums. Moon, supra note 5. See
also J.C. Thom, Comment, Digital Sampling: Old-Fashioned Piracy Dressed Up in Sleek
New Technology, 8 Loy. ENT. L.J. 297 (Spring 1988).
8. Some, primarily those who exploit sampled material, regard sampling as a
"postmodern artform," an "indispensable tool," and a modern "instrument." Respectively:
Jason H. Marcus, Don't Stop that Funky Beat: The Essentiality of Digital Sampling to
Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 767, 769 (Summer 1991); Moon, Supra note 5;
Paul A. Harris, Politics of Faith (No More, That Is), ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Sept. 11,
1992, at 4F.
9. J.C. Thom, Comment, Digital Sampling: Old-Fashioned Piracy Dressed Up in
Sleek New Technology, 8 Loy. ENT. L.J. 297, 336 (Spring 1988).
10. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (1992).
See infra text accompanying notes 176-89 for a discussion of this case.
[Vol. 11:65
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maining case failed to address any of the issues that most need
definitive clarification. The "complexities of this new technology
show that no easy solutions can be reached. It is necessary to strike
a balance"" between the need for sampling as an artistic tool and
the fact that unauthorized sampling is piracy.
A compulsory license12 would allow for limited use of samples
and require adequate compensation. This strikes an equitable bal-
ance between the competing concerns of piracy and artistry, and
would solve the legal ambiguity surrounding sampling and the
practical problems within the music industry by setting clear, de-
finitive standards.1 s Further, a compulsory license would comport
with the Constitutional scheme of promot[ing] "the progress of
[the] . . . arts""' by enacting legislation, and stay in line with the
heart of copyright policy to "foster the creativity of individuals by
affording them protection from the appropriation of their work."' 5
The compulsory license proposed in this Comment is premised
on four criteria: (1) general notions of fairness that one should be
compensated if one's unique talent and labor are stolen; (2) bal-
ancing the piracy/artistry dichotomy; (3) promoting the arts; and
(4) setting clear, definitive standards to clear up the industry-wide
ambiguity and avoid wasted time, money and hassles. Experts
agree that with the increased use of digital technology, the dilem-
mas presented by sampling need to be solved through "clarifying
legislation."' 6
11. McGraw, supra note 3, at 169.
12. A compulsory license is a statutory provision whereby a copyright owner is com-
pelled to license his copyrighted work to another person upon satisfaction of certain require-
ments and payment of a set fee. The Copyright Act currently provides for five types of
compulsory licenses: cable transmissions of television programs, § 111; satellite transmis-
sions of television programs, § 119; phonorecords, § 115; jukeboxes, § 116; and noncommer-
cial broadcasting, § 118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1991). See infra text accompanying notes
211-41 for this Article's compulsory license proposal.
13. The scope of this Article is limited to the sampling of copyrighted sound record-
ings. A "sound recording" is a work that results from the fixation of a series of any sounds,
but does not include the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work.
Copyright Act, supra note 12, § 101. A composition refers to a written version of a musical
work, including any accompanying lyrics. See Act, § 102. A phonorecord is any material
object in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated. The term "phonorecords"
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. Act, § 101.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See infra text accompanying notes 60-69 for a discus-
sion of the purpose and scope of this clause.
15. Lori D. Fishman, Your Sound or Mine?: The Digital Sampling Dilemma, 4 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 205, 205 (Fall 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 71-73 for
a discussion of the purpose behind copyright law.
16. See A.B.A. COMM. REP., SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW Sec.
19931
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This Comment explains the digital sound sampling process, its
history and modern usage, and the effects of sampling on the mu-
sic industry. It then examines copyright law and argues that al-
though copyright law offers limited protection against sampling,
the law is too ambiguous in this context and has failed to solve the
dilemmas surrounding sampling. This Comment then examines the
current unpredictable, ad hoc music industry licensing practices
for sampling, and concludes by presenting a compulsory license
proposal. Adoption of this proposal would solve the dilemmas that
digital sound sampling currently poses to the music industry.
II. DIGITAL SOUND SAMPLING
A. Technical Process
To understand the sampling process, one must comprehend
the distinction between analog and digital sound. Analog music is a
continuous waveform, similar to all naturally occurring sounds.
Natural or acoustic sound waves are created by fluctuations in air
pressure, and, through the use of a microphone, sound waves can
be reduced to analogous fluctuations in electrical voltage, resulting
in a smooth and continuous analog sound. Thus, analog recordings
(traditional records and tapes) record and store music waveforms
directly and fully.
17
Digital music is created by recording and storing an outside
sound source in a computer system. Whereas an analog sound is a
continuous waveform, computers can only operate digitally, using
one number at a time. When recording sound waves, therefore, ei-
ther live or from a sound recording, a digital recording system
must record a binary code description of the original analog
waveform.18 This conversion process from analog waveform to bi-
nary code is accomplished through an analog-to-digital converter,
which measures the voltage of the analog signal at equally spaced
intervals in time"9 and generates a digital representation for each
306-B-1 90:160 at 164. The "lack of caselaw .. , and the increasing use of digital technology
. . . presents a situation that would benefit from clarifying legislation." Id. Accord Leon
Friedman, a solo practitioner in New York, professor of law at Hofstra University and lead-
ing copyright authority; Jeffrey E. Jacobson and Bruce E. Colfin of Jacobson & Colfin, P.C.,
in New York, both of whom are primarily engaged in the practice of music law.
17. Thomas D. Ar, Digital Sampling and Signature Sound: Protection under Copy-
right and Non-Copyright Law, 6 U. MiAmi ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 61, 64 (Spring 1989).
18. Ronald Mark Wells, You Can't Always Get What You Want But Digital Sam-
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recorded interval.2 The resulting code for each sample is recorded
on a digital master tape, and any subsequent copies reproduce
those numbers exactly.2 Because the computer is digitizing sound
waves at intervals in time, it is effectively slicing up the original
analog sound into thousands of separate samples each second
(hence the term "sampling").22 The sound is represented by num-
bers at intervals in time, and, therefore, a gap exists between any
two digits.2 3 This gap is known as the sampling interval. The fre-
quency with which samples are represented along the wavelength
is known as the sampling rate.24 Digital sound sampling operates
like a movie camera recording motion: instead of capturing the
whole action, a movie camera takes a consecutive series of still
photos, that, if taken at small enough intervals and displayed in
rapid sequence, will appear to exactly and fully recreate the origi-
nal motion.2 5 The best samplers can sample at the rate of 100,000
times per second,26 so there is obviously no loss of fidelity, and no
aural distinction between the original sound and the sample; the
human ear hears the identical music. From the foregoing analysis,
it is clear that sampling, by definition, is exact copying.
The computer code can also be fed into a digital-to-analog
converter, or "desampler," to duplicate the original sound waves,
or, if the computer code has been manipulated, to produce altered
sounds when converted to sound waves.
2 7
Although digital samplers can manipulate any sounds they
record by rearranging or replacing binary codes, the scope of ma-
nipulation is limited. "The sounds which digital sampling allows a
musician to produce are . . . dependent upon the intricacies of
sound captured on the underlying analog recording. ' 28 So although
there is "a range of potential manipulation, the sound that goes in
is the sound that comes out. '29 Digital samplers can alter pitch,
duration, or sequence of a sampled sound, give it more or less echo,
20. Id. at 700.
21. Gerald Seligman, Savedl! How Classic Rock Tracks are Kept Forever Young on
CD, 482 ROLLING STONE 81, 82 (1986).
22. McGraw, supra note 3, at 148.
23. Arn, supra note 17, at 64-65 n.17 (citing C. Dodge and T. Jerse, COMPUTER MUSIC:
SYNTHESIS, COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE 25-31 (1985)).
24. Id.
25. Suplee, supra note 2.
26. For example, "She loves you, yeh, yeh, yeh" would be sampled roughly 300,000
times, and the entire two minute, nineteen second song approximately 13,900,000 times.
27. A.B.A. COMM. REP., supra note 16, at 160.
28. Am, supra note 17, at 66.
29. Id. at 66 n.24.
1993]
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repeat it in any rhythm, or combine it with other sounds.30 The
sounds produced through sampling, however, are largely depen-
dent on the original sounds because sampling cannot manipulate
the timbre (distinctive tonal qualities) of sampled sounds.3 1 It is
precisely this fact-that sampling clones the unique tonal qualities
of a given sound-that makes it such a popular artistic tool.32 The
essential point to remember is that sampled sounds invariably re-
tain their unique qualities.
B. History and Modern Usage
Digital machinery has advanced quite rapidly. The Fairlight
CMI, with synthesizer capabilities and the capacity to digitally rec-
ord sounds, appeared in 1975 and was the first major digital sam-
pler.3 The first sampler with keyboard control (giving it the ability
to manipulate sampled sounds) appeared in 1981.81 The first inex-
pensive sampler, costing approximately $1700, appeared in 1985,
and today, samplers with limited capabilities can be purchased for
as low as $70. 85 Currently, the most advanced digital sampler is the
Synclavier (used by the likes of Stevie Wonder and Frank Zappa),
which costs over $300,000 and has a sampling rate of over 100,000
times per second."
The art of sampling, an art born out of poverty, had its birth
in the Bronx, New York. It made its debut around the early 1980's,
as disc jockeys and mixers were simply piecing together different
recordings, and using a variety of other techniques, such as
"scratching" and "looping, 3 7 to create a new dance atmosphere 8
at parties and playgrounds.3 "
Modern usage of samples is rampant. Sampling has become a
"common practice" in "most rap and much pop."'40 It is central to
30. McGraw, supra note 3, at 150.
31. Arn, supra note 17, at 65.
32. Id.
33. McGraw, supra note 3, at 148.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 149.
36. Id. at n.15.
37. "Scratching" is the process by which a needle is rapidly scratched over a vinyl
record. "Looping" is the process by which a small portion of a cassette tape is cut off and
reattached, so that the underlying beat thereon is continually played, or "looped."
38. Sampling: Fair Play or Foul?, THE FIRM (Newsletter #9, Jacobson & Coffin, New
York, N.Y.), 1991, at 2.
39. Sheila Rule, Record Companies are Challenging 'Sampling' in Rap, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1992, at C13.
40. John Leland, The Moper vs. the Rapper: A Lawsuit, Naturally, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
6, 1992, at 55.
[Vol. 11:65
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rap, a billion-dollar-a-year industry,"1 and has been a driving force
behind the albums of pop stars such as Vanilla Ice and Janet Jack-
son. Today, "[a]lmost every pop record contains at least one sam-
pled sound' 2 and many albums contain dozens.' One genre of
music-"House Music"-has sprung up from the night club scene,
which is composed entirely of samples.
Sampling has also resulted in whole new professions of elec-
tronic music makers and mixers, commonly referred to as "pro-
grammers." Programmers are often employed by a record company
or album producer to contribute to the recording process. Some-
times they are the sole composer of a musical work. Each program-
mer seeks "to build a library of sounds on which he can base his
commercial viability. . . . [A] programmer is valued by the extent
of his library and his ability to manipulate the sounds recorded
therein.' 4 Programmers acquire their libraries from live studio
sessions' and preexisting recordings."" The demand for samples of
popular musicians and distinctive sounds has become so high that
a "black market" has emerged in recording studios.47 "Sound col-
lecting has become a frenzied sport, with engineers swapping
sounds like baseball cards.""
Some programmers think of their trade as a modern art form.
Arthur Baker, one of the "kings" of audio cut and paste, has been
quoted as saying that "[sampling] is a new form of music, just like
collages.. . . [I]f you like [a] sound, you can have the sound."' 9
The benefits of sampling, as opposed to using live musicians,
are enormous. Producers who use samples reap huge benefits, both
financially and through increased creative reputation, at little or
41. Rule, supra note 39.
42. Moon, supra note 5.
43. Leland, supra note 40. See also Billboard magazine's album and review sections,
where one can find over one hundred references in the last year (11/91-11/92) to samples in
newly released recordings. Common descriptors used include "sample laden," "sample
happy," "sample ridden," a "mind blowing blitz" of samples and a "dazzling display" of
samples.
44. Maura Giannini, The Substantial Similarity Test and its Use in Determining
Copyright Infringement through Digital Sampling, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
509, 511 (Winter 1990).
45. E.g., note the Miami Vice example, infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
46. E.g., note the Led Zeppelin example, infra text accompanying note 51.
47. Arn, supra note 17, at 68, n.34 (citing Steven Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is it
Theft? Technology Raises Copyright Questions, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 74, n.33).
48. Moon, supra note 5.
49. Miller, High-Tech Alteration of Sights and Sounds Divides the Arts World, WALL
ST. J., Sept., 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1. Baker's allusion to collages is less fortunate than he might
think. Collage artists such as Andy Warhol have been sued for unauthorized use of copy-
righted materials in their collages. McGraw, supra note 3, at n.38.
19931
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no personal expense of time, talent, money, or original artistic cre-
ativity.50 Without sampling technology, a musician or producer
searching for a particular sound would have to hire musicians with
the right instruments for a studio session and hope to get the right
sound. With sampling, however, one can record a string of notes
and electronically manipulate the recorded, digitized sounds to
closely approximate the sound sought, or simply lift the sound
from another recording. Producer/remixer Freddie Bastone has
stated,
[i]n some cases, you use a sample because its [sic] a really
unique sound you want and it would be impossible to get other-
wise, like [John] Bonham's kick drum [from the Led Zeppelin
album "Houses of The Holy"] .... [Y]ou could probably, with
a lot of setup and experimentation, get the sound you are after.
But it is so much faster to use a sample.5 1
In another high-profile case of sampling, the sounds of musi-
cian David Earl Johnson's eighty year old African conga drums
were sampled in a studio by composer Jan Hammer and became
prominently featured in the theme song of the hit television show
"Miami Vice."'52 Johnson has stated, "[t]hose congas . . . are way
up front because they are so unique. I'd like to get paid for that. If
your work is used, you should get paid. He's got me and my best
sounds for life, and there is no compensation." 58
The effects of digital sound sampling on music have been di-
chotomous. Sampling has allowed whole new genres of music to
develop, yet it has also been the driving force behind destruction
of the artistic base. Sampling has clearly promoted music" in the
sense that rap and house music would not have developed without
it, and sampling has played a very influential role in pop music. 5
Sampling has, however, adversely affected music because it has re-
placed the need for studio and concert musicians. Furthermore, it
has diminished the value of distinctive musical artistry by allowing
50. Thomas C. Moglovkin, Original Digital: No More Free Samples, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 135, 141 (1990).
51. Giannini, supra note 41, at 511 n.15 (citing Steven Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is It
Theft? Technology Raises Copyright Question, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 74.
52. Giannini, supra note 44, at 511, n.10.
53. Id.
54. Rule, supra note 39.
55. It is important to note that subjective opinions of whether music such as rap or
house is "art" are irrelevant in determining the "promotion" of the arts. See, e.g., Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (holding that copyrightable
"authorship" should not be judged by standards of merit).
[Vol. 11:65
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sounds to be readily stolen and rendered commonplace. Simply
put, "musicians in America are being put out in the cold."5'
Another by-product of sampling is the creation of the "mod-
ern musician." Many of today's "major artists," such as New Kids
on the Block, cannot play an instrument, and some do not even
sing (remember Milli Vanilli?). Anyone who has ever gone to a pop
or rap concert or watched a music awards show has most likely
witnessed the use of digitally prerecorded tracks. The result is that
many performers have come to rely more on visual presentation
and less on musical talent. Sampling "has made it easy for no-tal-
ents to steal the creative work and sounds of their betters.
'5 7
The future effects of sampling seem to be that pop and rap are
becoming increasingly redundant. Perhaps all the computer driven,
sound-alike music will create a greater desire for authentic music.
As one music critic has commented, "[in an era when so many
acts employ digital sampling and machine-generated rhythms to
make music that sounds as if it were written by an oscilloscope, it's
a relief to find a band that uses the traditional lineup [of
instruments]. "58
III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND. PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTION AGAINST
SAMPLING
Current copyright law as applied to sampling is inherently am-
biguous, and fails to solve the dilemmas faced by the music indus-
try. There seems to be a general consensus that "[i]nterpretations
of the relevant laws leads [sic] one to unclear and uncertain re-
sults." 9 The primary questions are whether individual sounds or
short riffs are in and of themselves protectable, and, if another ex-
ploits that sound, is it infringement? If the sound is altered un-
recognizably, is it infringement?
A. The United States Constitution
The United States Constitution states that Congress has the
56. Wells, supra note 18, at 691. "Many previously sought-after musicians who have
created a distinctive sound for themselves are now being undersold by samples of their own
work." Id. at 700. Sampling has "pushed time honored instruments into the background and
put thousands of string, brass and woodwind players out of work." Jonathan Takiff, High
Tech and Art, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, May 5, 1988, at 4F.
57. Jonathan Takiff, High Tech and Art, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, May 5, 1988, at
4F.
58. Mark Jenkins, Gilded Eternity: Time in a Loop, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1990,
at p. N25.
59. Sampling: Fair Play or Foul?, supra note 38.
1993]
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power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'' Note that
artists do not have a Constitutional right to their works; rights are
conferred by Congress, through its power to grant authors limited
monopolies.
The courts construe the power to "promote the progress of
.. . [the] arts"6 broadly."2 The copyright clause does not require
that each copyrightable work promote the arts, only that Congress
shall promote these ends by its Copyright legislation. "[T]o pro-
mote the progress" is a preamble, indicating the purpose of the
power, but not a limitation of its exercise.64 Thus, Congress can
enact almost any law in order to further the promotion and pro-
gress of the arts.
A question sometimes debated, but never decided, deals with
the scope of Congress' power: Is Congress limited to conferring to
artists either "the exclusive right" to their creative works or no
rights at all?65 This debate is centered around the compulsory li-
cense provisions because these provisions are the primary examples
of where Congress has conferred non-exclusive rights.6 With com-
pulsory licenses, exclusive rights are lost because the owner of a
work under one of these provisions is compelled to license his or
her work to anyone who complies with the statutory requirements.
It seems clear, though, that the power to grant an "exclusive right"
is not a limitation of power, but rather a full grant of power to
Congress to enact whatever copyright legislation will best "pro-
mote the progress of" the arts.67
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. The term "writings" is construed broadly, and includes
literary, musical, dramatic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, architectural and audiovisual
works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)
(the first Supreme Court case to expressly state that sound recordings are "writings" in the
constitutional sense); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955) (where the court, in dictum, stated that sound recordings are "writings" in the consti-
tutional sense, capable of copyright); Schaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (holding that sound recordings are "writings" in the constitutional sense). MELVILLE
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.08[B] at 1-45, 1-46 (1987).
61. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
62. "(P]rotection of all [copyrightable works], without regard to their content, is a
constitutionally permissible means of promoting. . . [the] arts." Mitchell Bros. Film Group
v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979).
63. MEVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.03[B] at 1-44.17 (1987).
64. Id. § 1.03[A] at 1-34.
65. The copyright clause only mentions "exclusive" rights and makes no express men-
tion that Congress can confer limited rights. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. See supra note 12, for a listing of the five compulsory licenses under the Act.
67. NIMMER, supra note 63, at p. 1-44.18.
[Vol. 11:65
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Sampling also fosters a First Amendment controversy. Some
samplers attempt to seek sanctuary behind the First Amendment
by arguing that they have the right to freely express themselves
musically. This position, however, ignores the Copyright Act's pro-
tection of copyrighted works. The First Amendment is not a li-
cense for theft and exploitation. As the court in United States v.
Bodin68 stated, there is no "first amendment right . . . to usurp
the benefits of the creative and artistic talent, technical skills and
investment necessary to produce a single long-playing record of a
musical performance. 6
B. The 1976 Copyright Act
7
0
The 1976 Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression. ' 7 The purpose behind
copyright law is to "encourage people to devote themselves to in-
tellectual and artistic creation '7 2 and protect the authors of copy-
rightable works from the "theft of the fruits of their labor" (i.e.,
artistry and piracy).7 3 Granting rights in the creator of an artistic
work stimulates creative endeavors through an economic incentive.
The originality required for copyright in a work is very low.
"[A]lmost any ingenuity in selection, combination or expression,
no matter how crude, humble or obvious, will be sufficient."' " To
date, however, there has been no judicial interpretation of what
constitutes originality in a sound recording.75 Even so, it is argua-
ble that all sound recordings and sounds therein are unique.7 6 Au-
thorship requires that a work be independently, not merely
68. 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
69. Id. at 1267 (holding there is no first amendment right to usurp labor of another
because a pirate does not seek to express himself creatively, but to express another's
creativity).
70. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976) (amended 1991).
71. § 102(a). It is this Comment's position that all unauthorized sampling of copy-
righted sound recordings is in violation of current copyright law. Even if one thinks that
sampling is not fully protected against under current law, however, this Comment argues
that all sound recordings are "original" artistic expression, and as such, all unauthorized
sampling should be protected against by enacting a limited compulsory license for the use of
samples. See infra text accompanying notes 103-07 for the argument that all sound record-
ings are "original."
72. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
73. NiMMER, supra note 63, at 13.03[E][2], p.13 -19 .
74. Id. at 1.08[C][1] p. 1-49.
75. Moglovkin, supra note 50, at 152.
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mechanically, created." Authorship is also interpreted broadly. In
Goldstein v. California,5 for example, the court defined "author-
ship" as "'he to whom anything owes its origin'; originator. 7 9 The
statutory requirement that 'a work be "fixed" in a "tangible me-
dium of expression" is satisfied by having a sound recorded and
stored in a digital sampler.8 " One must understand that copyright
only protects artistic expression, and never the underlying ideas.
8 1
The Copyright Act is preemptive,82 meaning that any state law
that conflicts with the Act's objectives is invalid. Regarding sound
recordings, the Act does not protect pre-February 15, 1972, sound
recordings, and so allows state law to protect those works. Section
301(c), however, states that, beginning February 15, 2047, state law
will no longer be permitted to protect sound recordings.s
The key to understanding copyright protection of musical
works is in knowing that there are two distinct types of copyright
in music, which confer different sets of rights:84 one for the under-
lying composition and another for the sound recording.8 5 A copy-
77. See Moglovkin, supra note 50, at 144-45.
78. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
79. Moglovkin, supra note 50, at 144.
80. § 102(a) of the Act states that the fixation requirement is satisfied by fixation in
"any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which [a work]
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device." A sampler qualifies under this definition.
81. § 102(b). For example, copyright will protect an original poem, but does not give
the author a monopoly over the words themselves because words are the very tools, or
"ideas," with which people commonly express themselves. Likewise, musical compositions
are protected, but not the individual notes therein that comprise the composition.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 88-127 for a discus-
sion of sound recording protection.
84. The rights attaching to a composition, and all other categories of copyrightable
works, are delineated under § 106, which grants the exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare
derivative works, distribute, perform, and display the copyrighted work. Composition rights
are limited by § 115's compulsory license provision, which allows anyone to independently
record and distribute phonorecords embodying their own version of a musical composition,
provided they comply with certain formalities and payments. Section 114 limits the rights
to a sound recording to § 106(1)-(3). The two specific exclusions on the rights to a sound
recording are: (1) the owner of a sound recording cannot prevent others from "imitating or
simulating" the sound recording; and (2) the owner of a sound recording has no performance
rights, meaning that he cannot prevent others from publicly performing the sound recording
(e.g., in nightclubs or on the radio) and he is not entitled to collect royalties for any public
performances. Further, the sound recording copyright does not confer proprietary rights in
the phonorecord in which the recording is embodied.
85. See supra note 13, for definitions of "sound recording," "phonorecord" and com-
position. Most often, the record company that funds the production of the sound recording
will buy the copyright of each author, making it the exclusive copyright holder in the sound
recording. Authors of a sound recording could be artists, producers, engineers, or anyone
who contributes "original authorship" to the work.
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right in the composition confers protection in the musical work it-
self (i.e., the written composition of the work), including any
accompanying words.86 A copyright in a sound recording is com-
pletely separate from one in a composition.
Under the Copyright Act, four requirements must be met in
order to gain federal copyright protection in a sound: (1) the sound
must "result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or
other sounds;"88 (2) the sound must be "fixed" by any method
"now known or later developed" in a material object (pho-
norecords) "from which [the sounds] can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device;"8 " (3) the sound must be fixed in a phonorecord on
or after February 15, 1972;9o and (4) the sound must constitute an
"original" work.91
Historically, sound recordings have suffered from a lack of
protection. In the 1960's and 1970's, one-fourth of all records and
tapes sold in the U.S. were illegal duplicates.9 2 In reaction to this
"staggering volume" of record and tape piracy, Congress passed
the Sound Recording Amendment 3 to specifically "provide for the
creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings. ' 94 The Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971 became effective on February 15,
1972, and in 1974 was made a permanent part of the Copyright Act
of 1909.95 For the first time, statutory copyright was granted to
sound recordings.9 6
Although sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972,
are ineligible for protection under the Copyright Act, they may re-
main the subject of common law copyright if unpublished or sub-
86. § 102(a)(2). Lyrics, however, may be separately copyrighted.
87. See § 102(a). The rights in a sound recording are more limited than those in a
composition. Section 114(b) allows for the making of a sound recording "that consists en-
tirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simu-
late those in the copyrighted sound recording." Although one may independently imitate a
sound recording, one must still obtain a license to use the underlying composition (because
compositions are fully covered under § 106), and, in order not to violate trademark and




91. § 102(a); A.B.A. COMM. REP., supra note 16, at 161.
92. Giannini, supra note 44, at 514.
93. NIMMER, supra note 63, § 2.10[A], at 2-145, 2-146.
94. KASTENMEIR, PROHIBITING PIRACY OF SOUND RECORDINGS, H.R. REP. No. 92-487,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See A.B.A. COMm. REP., supra note 16, at 160.
95. Codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1991).
96. KASTENMEIR, PROHIBITING PIRACY OF SOUND RECORDINGS, H.R. REP. No. 92-487,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See A.B.A. COMm. REP., supra note 16, at 160.
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ject to other state law protection . 7 Once a pre-February 15, 1972,
work is published, the sound recording is protected in most states
by anti-record piracy statutes, and by common law doctrines of
misappropriation and unfair competition.98
It seems illogical and unfair that pre-February 15, 1972, sound
recordings are not covered under the Act. Why this vast exclusion?
Professor Nimmer offers a convincing and insightful analysis. He
states that this exclusion resulted
inadvertently, and as a result of a misconception upon the part
of the Department of Justice .... The Department of Justice
expressed the fear that unless state law protection for such pre-
1972 recordings were exempted from federal preemption, the re-
sult would be an "immediate resurgence of piracy of pre-Febru-
ary 15, 1972, sound recordings." The Senate adopted this argu-
ment, and in order to meet it, added a new section 301(b)(4),
which expressly excluded from federal preemption, state laws
with respect to "sound recordings fixed prior to February 15,
1972." What both the Justice Department and the Senate over-
looked was the fact that a resurgence of record piracy would not
have resulted even if state record piracy laws were preempted
for the reason that Section 303 of the bill in the form adopted
by the Senate would have conferred statutory copyright upon all
sound recordings (as well as other works of authorship) that had
not theretofore entered the public domain. . . .Thus, even if
record piracy of pre-1972 recordings would no longer be prohib-
ited by state law, it would have been prohibited by federal law.99
Nonetheless, the House adopted an amendment, Section 301(c),
that excludes all pre-February 15, 1972, sound recordings from
statutory copyright. Thus, the "Justice Department's mistaken be-
lief that pre-1972 sound recordings were excluded from statutory
copyright under the general revision bill led to an amendment
which validated that belief."100
Although the Act clearly protects post-1972 sound recordings
97. § 301(c). There is no federal preemption here because the Act does not protect
this body of works, and therefore state law protection does not conflict with federal law.
98. HOWARD ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, n.97 at 5-24 (1991). See, e.g., Cal. Pe-
nal Code, § 653(h) (West 1988); N.Y. Penal Law, § 275 (McKinney 1989). The scope of this
Comment is limited to protection under copyright law, and does not explore potential state
remedies for protection against sampling. Those doctrines, however, are limited in scope, are
ad hoc and vague, may pose preemption problems, and have failed to solve any of the dilem-
mas that sampling presents. Clarifying federal legislation is needed. For an analysis of un-
fair competition as applied to sampling, see Am, supra note 17; of unfair competition, pub-
licity, and the right of attribution, see Moglovkin, supra note 50.
99. NIMMER, supra note 63, § 2.10[B] at 2-156.
100. Id. at 2-157.
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from "duplication, '" 10 1 there is considerable controversy and ambi-
guity over the extent to which they are protected. The problem is
that the Sound Recording Amendment was aimed only at tradi-
tional record piracy-the duplication of entire works-and did not
foresee uses of digital technology, which can lift isolated segments
of a work and then manipulate that sound. Sound recording artists
are given a very specific and limited realm of protection-the ac-
tual sounds fixated on a phonorecord-but sampling threatens to
chip away at the limited area of protection that sound recording
artists rely on.102 At the very least, nothing in the Act specifically
precludes protection of sampled material.
Even if the Act's language does not expressly protect against
sampling, the Act should be amended to do so through a compul-
sory license provision, because all sound recordings and the sounds
therein are inherently unique, artistic expression. As pure expres-
sion, and part of a copyrightable work, there is no justification not
to protect all sounds in sound recordings. Arguably, each person's
creation of sound is an "original" expression subject to copyright
protection if duly fixed in a phonorecord. 03 One committee report
from the section on Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law of the
American Bar Association states:
[E]very musical performance ... or creation of sound could be
considered a work that is original, regardless of duration....
Following this analysis, any sound created by a person, whether
it be a peep or a symphony, is inherently an "original work of
authorship." The performance of one note or any part thereof
would be an original work of authorship not because the note is
original but because the performer's rendition of the note is
original. Moreover, each sound in a sound recording could be
viewed as a separate original work entitled to as much copyright
protection as the work as a whole. . . Thus, it is conceivable
that all sound in a sound recording could be entitled to copy-
right protection from duplication by re-recording. Even a split
second would not be deemed de minimis in an infringement
context.104
101. § 114(b) states that the owner of a copyright in a sound recording has the exclu-
sive right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords.
102. Thorn, supra note 9, at 333.
103. A.B.A. CoMM. REP., supra note 16, at 161.
104. Id. See also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., where Learned
Hand, in dissent, stated that the fundamental notes of a composition are distinct from each
performance of it, all of which may be "pro tanto quite as original a 'composition' as an
'arrangement' or 'adaptation' of the score itself.. ." 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand,
J., dissenting) (the majority was in agreement on this point).
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Professor Nimmer has stated also that all sounds within a re-
cording may be protectable by copyright:
[A]ny instrumental performance, . . . be it musical or spoken,
contains what Justice Holmes referred to as "something irreduc-
ible, which is one man's alone," and which may be the subject of
copyright. The emphasis or the shading of a musical note, the
tone of voice, the inflection . .. can all be original with the per-
former. . . [Even with nonhuman "performers" such as nature
sounds] there may nevertheless be an original contribution by
the record producer so as to qualify the recording for
copyright.105
Composer Jan Hammer,106 who regularly uses sampled sounds,
also admits the essentiality of sampling to obtain unique sounds:
"[T]here's no way to re-create what [individual artists] sound
like-the nuances they bring to music.
'107
Part of the controversy as to whether all sounds are protect-
able under the Copyright Act centers on Section 101 of the Act.
Some argue that Section 101 bars protection for anything less than
a "series of sounds." There are three compelling arguments, how-
ever, in response: (1) "series" is not defined in the Act; (2) origi-
nally, sampled sounds were part of a series of fixed sounds; and (3)
the framers of the Act were not aware of the possibilities for in-
fringement inherent in digital technology. Thus, the "series of
sounds" requirement should not bar protection for sounds that are
embodied in a sound recording.
Another reason for the ambiguity concerning whether sam-
pling is prohibited under the Act is centered on the debate
whether sampling can be characterized as imitative (which is not
infringing) or duplicative (which is proscribed). 10 8 In proving in-
fringement, one must prove that the sample is a "duplication.' ' 109
Law reviews have generally argued that sampling violates Sec-
tion 114 of the Act, which expressly prohibits duplicating the exact
sound in a copyrighted sound recording." 0 The sampling process
105. NIMMER, supra note 63, § 2.10[A] at 2-150.
106. Recall the Miami Vice example, supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
107. Moon, supra note 5.
108. Section 114 proscribes duplication of a sound recording that "directly or indi-
rectly recapture[s] the actual sounds fixed in the recording," but allows for one to "imitate
or simulate" the sounds.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 17-32 for a discussion of the sampling process
showing that sampling is a duplication, not imitation.
110. E.g., Jason H. Marcus, Don't Stop that Funky Beat: The Essentiality of Digital
Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ETr. L.J. 767, 770 (Summer 1991). See also
Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic
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does not independently create sounds when it re-records from an-
other recording, so by definition the process is not imitative; imita-
tion requires two separate entities where one is capable of indepen-
dently "following" the actions of another, of "mimicking." '
Although a modern sampler is capable of imitative behavior if it
has a library of sound and synthesizer capabilities, the sampling
process itself merely duplicates sound through a mechanical pro-
cess. A mechanical recapturing is not an independent fixation,
12
and is not capable of obtaining copyright protection.
Nevertheless, arguments that sampling is permissible imita-
tion persist. First, some argue that "[i]nterpreting the statute to
proscribe digital sampling would produce results contrary to Con-
gress' intent" because Congress only intended to proscribe record
piracy for duplication of all or substantial portions of a record-
ing. " Such an interpretation could hardly be contrary to Con-
gress' intent, however, if Congress was not even aware of digital
technology and its potentials, which would surface nearly a decade
later. Congress was faced with the two extremes of total record
piracy or mere imitation; there was no capability of extracting and
manipulating isolated sounds from sound recordings. Simply put,
any "[u]nauthorized reproduction of a copyright author's sound vi-
olates the Act's intent.""
A second argument that sampling is not proscribed is that the
compilation and manipulation of sounds is enough to create au-
thorship.1 5 Even if a sampler's contribution is enough to satisfy
copyright's minimal "originality" requirement, however, "original-
ity" never confers copyright where a work is merely mechanically
reproduced, 6 and "originality" does not justify the fact that the
original material and unique talent and labor have been pirated.
Could one gain copyright of a Wallace Stevens poem on the basis
of an "original" contribution by making the type face green? Of
course not, but that is the extent to which sampling alters the orig-
inal musical expression-it clones the unique expression and sim-
Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1732-33 (1987) (arguing that sampling is
re-recording, not imitation).
111. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 663 (Revised edition, 1975).
112. For example, if a programmer were able to independently create a code that,
when desampled through a digital-to-analog converter, exactly imitated or simulated the
sounds of a sound recording, this fixation would be a copyrightable, independent fixation.
113. Ar, supra note 17, at 74.
114. Thom, supra note 9, at 309.
115. Am, supra note 17, at 74.
116. Id. at 63-64, stating that "[m]ere mechanical reproduction of another's work does
not satisfy the originality requirement, no matter how novel the reproducing process."
1993]
17
Baroni: A Pirate's Palette: The Dilemmas of Digital Sound Sampling and a
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
82 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
ply casts it in a different setting. 117
A third argument that sampling should be considered as imi-
tative is that it offers "creative flexibility to artists," whereas tradi-
tional record piracy does not. Sampling is, therefore, "not pro-
scribed under the act." ' What can be done to a recording after it
has been pirated, however, is irrelevant to whether the recording
has been pirated in the first place: "creative flexibility" is hardly a
basis for copyright. One author has stated that "[clharacterizing
sampling as a rerecording is akin to claiming a photograph is
merely a literal duplication of the object photographed."'1 , What
that argument fails to recognize is that sampling a sound recording
cannot be analogized to photographing an original subject because
a photograph is merely an image of its natural subject, whereas
sampling duplicates not, for example, the orchestra that was re-
corded, but the original recording. With recorded music, there is
no distinction between perceiving a sample and perceiving the
original recording, because the aural result is identical, whereas a
photograph is clearly a distinct and distinguishable entity from its
subject.
A fourth argument that sampling is not proscribed because it
is imitative is that sampling only takes "style" from a sound re-
cording and style is "something which Congress never sought to
protect in enacting the copyright framework."1 0 It is true that
copyright does not protect style and that Congress never intended
it to. This argument, however, is premised on the assumption that
sampling is purely imitative, 12 1 so the argument cannot be used to
show that sampling actually is imitative.
A fifth argument that sampling is permissible because it is im-
itative is that sampling consists of an independent fixation of
sounds.'22 This argument is premised on the fact that samples are
117. The musical medium is different from the written one, though, because music has
two practical mediums of expression: written and aural. With sound recording duplication
(whether music or literature being read), one is cloning the exact, unique, artistic expres-
sion, whereas in the written medium, each typeset word or note on a page is only an unpro-
tectable idea. It is only the combination of these "ideas" that creates authorial expression in
the written medium.
118. Am, supra note 17, at 74.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 80.
121. This argument is circular in its reasoning. Style, by definition, is an intangible
concept, and intangible ideas or concepts are expressly unprotected by copyright. See
§ 102(b). The taking of "style," an abstract concept, implicitly requires imitation. Sampling,
however, does far more than imitate the general "style" of another's sounds; it clones the
sounds themselves.
122. Sounds that are independently fixed do not infringe the copyright of a sound
[Vol. 11:65
18
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss1/5
DILEMMAS OF DIGITAL SAMPLING
played back through a synthesizer (a musical instrument) and are
then combined with other musical instruments to make up a new
recording. 123 This is a very weak argument, however, because digi-
tal samplers have a computer's memory and are therefore more
than just instruments. Further, if this argument were accepted, it
would mean that any time one merely played back a sound record-
ing and re-recorded it with changes, one could escape infringement
on the grounds of independent fixation. Sampling is not imitative,
independent fixation because sampled sounds are unique when
taken and unique they stay. 2 " If sampling were imitative, it would
not duplicate the exact, unique sound qualities; because sampling
does duplicate unique qualities, it is duplication and proves that
sampled sounds are not independently fixed.
Sampling is the mechanical cloning of sound, the mere
mechanical reproduction of another's work, and does not satisfy
the originality requirement of copyright, no matter how novel the
reproducing process.1 15 There is no artistic skill in the mere rere-
cording of a sound recording, and creative post-re-recording ma-
nipulation of the sounds is irrelevant. In United States v. Taxe,' "
for example, the court instructed the jury that modifications to a
re-recording did not constitute an independent fixation. 
1 7
Although it is arguable that all sounds embodied in a sound
recording are protected by current copyright law, controversies still
rage as to the extent of that protection. Hence, the scope of protec-
tion against sampling afforded by current copyright law remains
ambiguous.
1. Infringement of Sound Recordings 2 "
"Digital sampling is .. .potentially an enormous source of
recording. Section 114 of the Act states that a copyright owner of a sound recording cannot
prevent another from making a sound recording that "consists entirely of an independent
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copy-
righted sound recording."
123. Wells, supra note 18, at 701.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
125. Am, supra note 17, at 63-64. See also Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that copyright originality does not subsist in manufacturing
skill, but rather must be the product of artistic skill).
126. 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), affd, vacated and remanded in part, 540
F.2d 961 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
127. Id. at 1017.
128. The focus of this section is limited to the infringement of sound recordings, as
opposed to compositions, because the legal controversy is centered in this area.
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copyright litigation." '129 Music plagiarism litigation of all types has
suffered from poor legal and musical analysis, 130 and can be very
complicated and expensive. Even a successful defense of copyright
infringement can cost $150,000 or more."' Although the same test
is applied to sound recordings as for compositions, this test is diffi-
cult to apply to sound recordings because of the differences in pro-
tection the Act affords to each and the inherent differences in the
two mediums.
1 32
There are two fundamental elements of copyright infringe-
ment: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of that
copyrighted work. 33 This Comment assumes there is ownership of
a valid copyright in the sampled sound recording. Copying, be-
cause it is rarely witnessed, may be shown indirectly by access to
the work and substantial similarity.134 Access is easily shown with
popular musical works because it is generally presumed if a de-
fendant has had a reasonable opportunity to be exposed to the
original work.1 35 Substantial similarity is likewise an evidentiary
device to allow an inference of copying.
Before seeking to protect one's rights, however, one must obvi-
ously detect the infringing use. Samples in the infringing work can
either be blatant or well disguised, so discovering samples "can be
a bit like Easter-egg hunts: some can't be missed, others require a
painstaking search.'
1 6
The substantial similarity standard of infringement is clearly
inadequate as applied to sampling. It is ad hoc, vague, and unpre-
dictable. Substantial similarity "presents one of the most difficult
questions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible
of helpful generalizations." ' 7 Justice Learned Hand has com-
mented that "wherever [the line] is drawn [to mark substantial
129. Wells, supra note 18, at 699. For an analysis of sampling litigation, see Robert G.
Sugarman and Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Litigation in the Limelight, N.Y. L.J., March 16,
1992, at 1, col. 1.
130. See Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Liti-
gation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1988).
131. Whitney C. Broussard, Current and Suggested Business Practices for the Licens-
ing of Digital Samples, 11 Loy. ENT. L.J. 479, 481 (1991).
132. Giannini, supra note 44, at 516.
133. NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.01 at 13-6.
134. Id. at § 13.01[B], 13-11. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977).
135. NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.02[A] at 13-17, notes this is the prevailing view. See
also Smith v. Little Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
136. John Horn, Borrowed Performances May Get Rappers in Trouble, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, June 7, 1989, at lB.
137. NIMMER, supra note 63, § 13.03[A] at 13-27.
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similarity] will seem arbitrary." '138 Although there is widespread
uncertainty as to the appropriate test for establishing substantial
similarity,'3 9 all substantial similarity tests revolve around qualita-
tive and quantitative analyses: What portions were taken, how
much was taken, and how was the taken material used?
In United States v. Taxe, 4 ° the court held that one seeking to
prove infringement of a sound recording must, in addition to show-
ing that the defendant's work is a re-recording and not an imita-
tion, show that the two works are substantially similar."' In Taxe,
the defendants re-recorded hit tapes produced and distributed by
major record companies, and mechanically altered them by speed-
ing up or slowing down sounds, deleting frequencies or tones, or
adding echoes or sounds from a synthesizer, all in an effort to pro-
duce technically altered recordings and thereby circumvent the
Sound Recording Act's prohibition on re-recording.I42 Although
Taxe required a finding of substantial similarity, the case was de-
cided a full decade before the advent of digital technology's capac-
ity to lift individual sounds from a sound recording. Further, Taxe
did not analyze how substantial similarity should be applied in
sound recording cases, and there is "considerable confusion in the
courts" on how to do so."43 Professor Nimmer, whose treatise is the
acknowledged standard reference in the copyright field, does not
even analyze how it should be applied in sound recording cases as
opposed to those cases in the written medium.144 In addition, be-
cause imitation is allowed but rerecording is not, substantial simi-
larity fails to provide any basis from which an inference of actual
copying can be made.
There are considerable, perhaps insurmountable, problems
with applying substantial similarity to sampling. The substantial
similarity standard confers "very uncertain" protection for sam-
pled artists,' 45 and application of this standard is necessarily ad
hoc and vague. The standard leads to inequitable results because,
depending on the nature of the works and how the sample is used,
an insignificant taking could be held to be substantially similar,
138. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
139. McGraw, supra note 3, at 160.
140. 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, vacated and remanded in part, 540
F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
141. Id. at 1017.
142. Giannini, supra note 44, at 525, 526.
143. A.B.A. CoMM. REP., supra note 16, at 163.
144. Id. See NIMMER, supra note 63, at § 13.03.
145. Am, supra note 17, at 77.
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whereas a sample of a significant "hook" 1 6 portion may not be
held to be substantially similar. Additionally, one could potentially
take an insignificant part of an artist's unique sounds and build an
entire song around the sample without infringing the artist's work.
This scehiario is contrary to copyright law, which expressly prohib-
its duplication of actual sounds in sound recordings and does not
distinguish between a whole sound recording and isolated pieces of
it.11 7 As Learned Hand stated in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate." 4" Further, a substantial simi-
larity analysis will fail if the sample is altered (which often occurs),
because it is unlikely that a jury would find the two works substan-
tially similar. This standard is inadequate as applied to sampling.
The rights violated by sampling can be twofold. First, the ini-
tial sampling violates the copyright holder's exclusive right to du-
plicate the sound in phonorecords,"' 9 because a digital sampler
qualifies as a "phonorecord" - a material object in which sounds
can be fixed and reproduced.1 50 That right is further infringed
upon duplication into albums. Second, if sounds are manipulated,
such manipulation constitutes a separate infringement of the copy-
right owner's exclusive right to prepare a derivative work ' 51 from
the actual sounds of the original sound recording.152 Thus, whether
a pirated sample is altered or not, the copyright owner's rights are
violated, but substantial similarity will not always recognize it.
Likewise, alternative infringement standards do not solve the
dilemmas of sampling or the legal ambiguity. At least one author
has suggested that substantial similarity be replaced by an audi-
ence "recognizability test," whereby infringement would be found
if the jury found the sample was still recognizable, although part of
a new work. 53 This standard represents a slight improvement in
that it would confer a broader scope of protection. It is likewise ad
hoc and unpredictable, however, and, like the substantial similarity
standard, ignores altered samples. Thus, other infringement stan-
dards do not solve the dilemmas that sampling presents.
146. The "hook" of a song is the catchy musical phrase or chorus that grabs the lis-
tener. WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, CAREERS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW 67 (1990).
147. Wells, supra note 18, at 704.




152. A.B.A. COMM. REP., supra note 16, 163.
153. Wells, supra note 18, at 705.
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Even if one suspects sampling, proving it may be difficult. Ac-
cess and copying are not issues, because by definition sampling is
copying. The primary issue is proving direct re-recording. There-
fore, "forensic" methods are required.15' Expert analysis of a sound
wave's "fingerprint" can determine if the defendant's sample was
taken from the plaintiff's work. 55 One New York based program-
mer, using a sophisticated digital sampler, has developed a method
of proving conclusively that a passage has been lifted from a pre-
existing recording and inserted into a new one; if the "musical fin-
gerprints match, a clear case of copying is established.' ' 56
2. The Fair Use Defense to Copyright Infringement
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement. 57
Fair use is arguably "the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole
law of copyright,"'5 8 and, particularly in the music medium, it is
highly unpredictable because musicians never know how much and
what type of use may be deemed "fair."
There are four primary factors in determining fair use. 59 The
first factor is "the purpose and character of use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes."' 60 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 'e the court held that a finding of commercial use results in
two rebuttable presumptions against the defendant: (1) no com-
mercial use is a fair use; and (2) every commercial use poses a po-
tential harm to the market for or value of the copyrighted work.' 62
Thus, the Sony holding would seem to preclude any fair use claim
in the sampling context, because sampling is intrinsically commer-
cial and is not used for any nonprofit or educational purpose.'
The second factor for determining fair use, "the nature of the
154. See, e.g., Judith Greenberg Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital Sampling,
N.Y. L.J., May 22, 1992, at 5, col. 1.
155. David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Music Copyright and the New Technolo-
gies, 7 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, at 4 (Summer/Fall 1988).
156. Giannini, supra note 44, at 518.
157. Section 107 of the Act, supra note 12, states that use of a copyrighted work is not
an infringement if used for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."
158. McGraw, supra note 3, at 166.
159. § 107(1)-(4).
160. § 107(1).
161. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
162. Id. at 451.
163. Bruce J. McGiverin, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protec-
tion Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REv., 1723, 1737 (1987).
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copyrighted work,'" 6 focuses on whether the work is creative or
informational. A finding of fair use is more likely when the work
copied from is informative in nature, because the public benefits
from the free exchange of informational material. Sampling, how-
ever, takes purely creative material, and thereby militates against a
fair use defense under the second factor.
165
The third factor for determining fair use is "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."1 The third factor focuses on a quantitative and
qualitative analysis, and is the basis of the de minimis use argu-
ment.167 Although the use of some samples may seem trifling in
comparison to the original work, all sound fixed in a recording is
original expression arguably capable of copyright protection. This
fact, combined with the fact that most samples are either qualita-
tively significant (the "hook" of the original work) or are quantita-
tively substantial (e.g., a sampled drum track), also militates
against fair use defense.
The fourth factor for determining fair use is "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." I In the pop music business, record producers are con-
stantly looking for new and interesting sounds; a good argument
can, therefore, be made that appropriation and exploitation of
such unique sounds is likely to dilute their value. The fourth fac-
tor, therefore, also militates against a fair use defense. In some
cases, however, where the sample is highly distinctive and the
"hook" of the sampled song, a defendant could argue that his use
actually enhanced the market for the original song. ' 6e
Thus, the fair use defense may not be applicable at all in the
sampling context. Even if the defense was applicable, it would still




167. Some samplers argue that their use is too insubstantial, or de minimis, to be con-
sidered copyright infringement. The phrase "de minimis" comes from the Latin phrase "de
minimis non curat lex," meaning the law does not take notice of trifling matters. BLACK'S
LAW DICrONARY 431 (1990).
168. § 107(4).
169. For example, it is likely that Vanilla Ice's platinum-selling single "Ice, Ice, Baby"
enhanced the market for the David Bowie song "Under Pressure" by its use of a highly
distinctive "hook" sample of the latter: The Ice song brought great exposure and recognition
to the Bowie song. Suit was filed for the unauthorized use of the sample, and the case was
settled for an undisclosed sum. Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay,
105 HAv. L. REV. 726, 728 (1992) [hereinafter A New Spin on Music Sampling].
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bility of the doctrine and partly because of the varied use of sam-
pling technology. It is undeniable that the fair use defense has
failed to be helpful in settling the dilemmas of sampling.17 0 Sam-
plers pirate and exploit the labor, talent, and uniqueness of an-
other's musical expression, and may adversely effect potential mar-





Generally, the sampler who is taken to court has often sam-
pled the "hook" of a song or some other distinctly recognizable
sound.1 73 Because all but one case have been settled or are pend-
ing,' there is a lack of definable legal standards to govern the use
of samples. Currently, most disputes are settled by paying a share
of the proceeds.
175
The only case decided to date regarding sampling is Grand
Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.," 6 which found
rapper Biz Markie guilty of infringement for sampling music from
Gilbert O'Sullivan's 1972 hit, "Alone Again (Naturally). 1 77 Dis-
trict Judge Kevin Duffy began the decision by quoting from Exo-
dus: "Thou shalt not steal."' 78 He halted sales of Markie's album
"I Need a Haircut," and ordered it pulled from stores.179 After
stating that defendants' conduct (unauthorized sampling) violated
both the Seventh Commandment and applicable copyright laws,
Judge Duffy limited the issue of the case to the sole question of
170. Rule, supra note 39.
171. There is the slim chance that sampled material that is used for parody could be
held fair use. In Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (M.D. Tenn. 1991),
the court held that the rap group 2 Live Crew's unauthorized use of the Roy Orbison song
"Oh, Pretty Woman" could be considered fair use because it was used as parody and the
intended audience was substantially different, thereby negating any adverse effect on the
market value of the original work. In this case, however, the plaintiffs did not claim unau-
thorized sampling, and it is highly unlikely that, given the commercial nature of the work, a
parody defense would have shielded defendants from a finding of infringement if sampling
were proven.
172. See Sugarman and Salvo, supra note 129, for an analysis of sampling litigation.
173. Sampling: Fair Play or Foul?, supra note 38.
174. The Beastie Boys, for example, were sued for five million dollars. The case was
settled for an undisclosed sum.
175. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINEss 254
(Simon & Schuster) (1991).
176. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
177. Id. at 185.
178. Id. at 183.
179. Leland, supra note 40.
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who owned the valid copyright to the song "Alone Again (Natu-
rally)" and the master recording thereof made by Gilbert
O'Sullivan. 180 Key to the decision was the fact that the defendants
"knew they were violating . . . the rights of others" and showed
"callous disregard for the law."'18 As Judge Duffy stated, "[o]ne
would not agree to pay to use material of another [as Biz Markie
had] unless there was a valid copyright!1' 82 The Grand Upright
decision, however, "'hasn't resolved any of the issues that every-
body's been waiting for,' like fair use, parody, or the use of an in-
distinct sample." 83
The defendants argued that, because stealing is rampant in
the music business, their conduct should be excused."' Judge
Duffy, however, stated that the argument that defendants "should
be excused because others in the 'rap music' business are also en-
gaged in illegal activity is totally specious. The mere statement of
the argument is its own refutation.' ' 85 Furthermore, Judge Duffy
warned all would be samplers that "[t]he resolution of any issue
left open in this civil matter should have no bearing on the poten-
tial criminal liability in the unique circumstances presented
here."' 86
The effect of Grand Upright is that record companies will now
insist that all samples be cleared, which will greatly increase the
cost of album production. 87 Because Grand Upright did not solve
any of the key issues, the current state of the law is left just as
uncertain as it was before the decision. Some artists feel, as Frank
Zappa did, the need to take the law into their own hands because
current law fails to adequately protect their rights; Zappa placed a
copyright notice on his albums warning that "unauthorized repro-
duction sampling is a violation of applicable laws and subject to
criminal prosecution.' 88  One thing is certain, however:
"[Siomething needs to be done" to set clear, definitive
standards. 89
180. 780 F. Supp. at 183.
181. Id. at 185.
182. Id. at 184.
183. Leland, supra note 40.
184. 780 F. Supp. at 183.
185. Id. at 184 n.2.
186. Id. at 183 n.3.
187. Leland, supra note 40.
188. Musicians Getting Upset with Free (Digital) Samples, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct.
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IV. CURRENT MUSIC INDUSTRY PRACTICES FOR LICENSING
SAMPLES1 9
The "most distressing concern with sampling is the confusion
in the industry."'' The current industry practices are ad hoc, "un-
predictable and probably unfair.'
'192
Artists often use samples and then get their lawyers to seek
permission. 9 ' There are five standard types of deals in music to-
day for licensing samples:"" (1) a free license; (2) a flat fee, which
is the norm, with fees ranging from $100 to over $10,000195 (in an
extreme example, the rap group 2 Live Crew paid roughly $100,000
to use sampled dialogue from the 1987 movie Full Metal Jacket in
their single "Me So Horny"); 19 (3) a royalty arrangement, which is
also frequently used, and generally ranges from between a half
cent to three cents per album; 197 (4) co-ownership; and (5) an as-
signment of rights.
Although those using distinctive samples will often seek a li-
cense before distribution of the recording in which it is embodied,
one estimate is that 99% of all drum samples are not cleared, 198
because drum beats are often rhythmatic and undistinctive, and
are thus easily disguised. Likewise, most short samples or those
that are altered unrecognizably are often not cleared.
Most successful artists and producers will pay a flat fee or roy-
alty, 99 the amount depending on quantitative and qualitative
analyses of the use and whether the sample was cleared before it
was used.2 00
190. For suggestions on licensing digital samples, see Colchamiro, To Clear or Not to
Clear: Licensing Digital Samples, 4 HOFSTRA Paop. L.J. (forthcoming, Fall 1993); Brous-
sard, supra note 131, at 502; A New Spin on Music Sampling, supra note 169. Even these
authors admit, however, that any private, ad hoc licensing system would still retain a degree
of "uncertainty."
191. Broussard, supra note 131, at 502.
192. Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling, supra note 169, at 729.
193. David Browne, Settling the Bill: Digital Sampling in the Music Industry, EN-
TERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Jan. 24, 1992, at 54. Accord Jeffrey E. Jacobson and Bruce E. Colfin,
of Jacobson & Colfin, P.C., in New York.
194. Broussard, supra note 131, at 498.
195. Stan Soocher, As Sampling Suits Proliferate, Legal Guidelines are Emerging,
N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1992, at 5, col. 1.
196. Browne, supra note 193.
197. Id.
198. Rule, supra note 39.
199. Id.
200. Obviously, fees will be much higher for samples that are not pre-cleared, because
of the unauthorized use and because the copyright owner (generally a record company)
knows that the sampling artist has already invested a great amount of time and money in
recording the album and so will pay a higher fee in order not to be forced to abort the
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Music industry practices demonstrate the general acknowl-
edgement that sampling should be compensable. M.C. Hammer, in
reference to his unauthorized sampling of Rick James' 1981 hit
"Super Freak" for his song "U Can't Touch This," stated: "I said,
'Hey, I gotta pay Rick for this.' I didn't need a lawyer to tell me
that." '' Failing to clear a sample can land a sampler in a multi-
million dollar law suit, so even those who do not think sampling is
piracy still frequently seek permission.2 0
Liability for unauthorized sampling always lies with the sam-
pling artist, because record companies include a standard indemni-
fication clause in the recording contract that releases the company
from all liability regarding the violation of any third party
rights.20" Most recording contracts require artists to tell their label
if any material on their album is not "original," a clause that is
acknowledged to apply to sampling. 20' The label's lawyer then
seeks legal permission, from the label that released the original re-
cording and from the writer and the publisher of the sampled
song.
205
Catching sampling can be an unproductive, time-wasting
chore. Regardless, some lawyers undertake the process of listening
to all newly released recordings and seeking compensation for cli-
ents whose work has been sampled. Some major music publishers
and record companies employ a similar practice, buying each pop
and rap album that hits the charts and having employees listen for
samples that may infringe upon the company's rights.2 06
The problems that sampling creates for the music industry
under the current situation are fairly obvious. The clearance of
samples can be unpredictable and time consuming, adding tens of
thousands of dollars to album production costs.2 0 7 According to
Daniel Hoffman, Senior Vice President of Tommy Boy, a leading
hip-hop label, the rap group De La Soul's second album featured
more than 50 samples and cost over $100,000 in clearance and legal
project or risk being sued.
201. A New Spin on Music Sampling, supra note 169, at 726. As a result, M.C. Ham-
mer split the music publishing royalties 50/50 with Jobete Music, the music publisher of
"Super Freak." Sampling: Fair Play or Foul?, supra note 38, at 3.
202. Rule, supra note 39.
203. Sampling: Fair Play or Foul?, supra note 38, at 2.
204. Browne, supra note 193.
205. Id. Thus, it is common practice to pay both the owner of the sound recording and
the owner of the underlying composition.
206. Broussard, supra note 131, at 482-83.
207. Some fear that rap may become too costly to produce. Rule, supra note 39.
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fees.208 "It's a legal and administrative hassle, and it costs . . . a
lot of money. ' 20 9 Lawyers have to plan elaborate negotiation strat-
egies based on a number of qualitative and quantitative positions
concerning the sampled piece and its use. Further, flat fees are
often arbitrary in the sense that they can be wholly unrelated to
the number of eventual record sales.210 Thus, although current in-
dustry practices are becoming more uniform, they are still unduly
time-wasting, expensive, and unpredictable. Clear, definable stan-
dards are needed that would conserve time and money and instill
predictability. A new compulsory license provision for samples
could provide just that.
V. A COMPULSORY LICENSE PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF DIGITAL
SAMPLES
A. Introduction to the Proposal
Unauthorized digital sound sampling is theft. It is also clear
that sampling has had an enormous influence on popular music
and has therefore promoted the arts. Because current law and mu-
sic industry practices have failed to adequately address the dilem-
mas that sampling presents, clarifying legislation is needed.211 A
compulsory license is perfectly suited to address the piracy-artistry
dichotomy and the other dilemmas of sampling.
The first compulsory license was the "mechanical" compulsory
license, enacted in the Copyright Act of 1909.212 It was enacted out
of fear that allowing exclusive recording licenses would create mo-
nopolies over music. Historically, where new technologies have
given rise to substantial controversies, compulsory licenses have re-
solved those controversies by stemming litigation and setting stan-
dards by which to operate. Because compulsory license provisions
are clearly spelled out in the Copyright Act, "they have not given
rise to litigation.
'213
208. Browne, supra note 193.
209. Id.
210. Most flat fee deals, however, will provide for additional flat fee payments upon
reaching certain plateaus of record sales.
211. Experts agree that the dilemmas presented by sampling would benefit from clari-
fying legislation. Supra note 16. See also Keyt, supra note 130 (suggesting compulsory li-
censes as a court-ordered remedy); A New Spin on Music Sampling, supra note 169, at 742
(proposing a statutory licensing scheme and mentioning a compulsory license).
212. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909 Act). This provision has been carried over into § 115 of
the 1976 Copyright Act.
213. ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5.03[C][2][a]. Currently, the Act provides for five types
of compulsory licenses: cable and satellite transmissions of television programs, §§ 111 and
19931
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Much of this proposal is similar to the current mechanical
compulsory license, and so will not address every aspect in explicit
detail. The reader may assume that any of the finer aspects not
addressed herein are identical to the compulsory license provision
under Section 115 of the 1976 Act. This Comment highlights those
areas where a compulsory license proposal would spark the most
debate and proposes solutions. Also note that this proposal would,
if adopted, merely set a standard from which to work, and would
not prevent parties from freely negotiating whatever deal they like.
B. The Proposal
1. Material Scope. - This compulsory license would give any
person the right to sample from any sound recording or audiovi-
sual work that has been distributed to the public in the United
States under authority of the copyright owner, and from any pub-
licly broadcast television program (whether received through tradi-
tional, cable, or satellite transmissions), and to make and dis-
tribute phonorecords embodying such samples. Thus, one could
sample from any sound recording, whether it contains, for exam-
ple, pop, soundtrack,214 or whale music. Regarding audiovisual re-
cordings, one would be able to sample from any video cassette, la-
ser disc, or any other device now or hereafter known from which an
audiovisual work can be perceived. Allowing for samples from
soundtracks, audiovisual recordings, and television recognizes the
interests in establishing the broadest possible artistic pool from
which sampling artists can borrow. Further, there is no compelling
reason not to open these markets to the sampling musician.
Voices, however, would be explicitly excluded, because they
are part of one's identity and identity is not within the subject
matter of copyright.21 5 Voices are not part of a composition per se,
but are unique to the performer, and are more properly protected
by state law claims of publicity, privacy, unfair competition, and
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.21
The compulsory license would allow a person to sample every-
119, respectively; phonorecords, § 115; jukeboxes, § 116; and noncommercial broadcasting,
§ 118.
214. A soundtrack is defined as "the dialogue, music, and sound effects that accom-
pany the pictures in a visual production." HENSLEE, supra note 146, at 68.
215. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., where the court stated that "[a] voice is as distinc-
tive and personal as a face. . . . To impersonate [one's] voice is to pirate [one's] identity."
849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, appropriating another's actual voice is even more
egregious than impersonating one's voice.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1993).
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thing from a peep to an entire, single instrumental track on a sin-
gle (e.g., just the guitar track, or just the saxophone). The sampler
would be limited to taking sound from a single, distinguishable
sound source on a recording. The maximum allowable taking
would be one sample per artist or group sampled from for each
sampling artist's album. For instance, for a single new album, a
person could sample only once from any and all Madonna record-
ings, once from any and all Led Zeppelin recordings, and so on. To
further illustrate, if one sampled Slash's guitar from Guns N'
Roses, one would be prohibited from using any other Guns N'
Roses sample, or any other Slash sample, for that one album.
Where the sound recording does not contain a musical arrange-
ment and the sounds are not readily distinguishable, however, one
could sample from all sounds concurrently. For example, in the
case of whale music, a sampler would not be limited to sampling
from a single whale on the tape; he could sample all sounds con-
currently. The purpose of limiting the license to one sample is to
prevent a sampler from capturing more than a slim amount of
unique sound and talent from any single source.
Some may argue that allowing one to sample an entire single
instrumental track from a single is excessive. This is the necessary
cut-off point, however, in order to ensure the clarity and predict-
ability of this compulsory license. Any other cut-off point would be
arbitrary or unworkable. Also, there are three compelling factors
that quell this objection: (1) artists would not want to use lengthy,
recognizable samples because of artistic pride and integrity, and
because excessive musical "borrowing" can be the quickest way to
music business ruin;217 (2) using a lengthy sample may not conform
to the rest of the new song, and if it did, those separate parts of
the new song would probably be substantially similar to the work
sampled from and thus an infringement of its underlying composi-
tion; and (3) the most compelling factor, it would simply cost too
much.218
The compulsory license would give the sampler an unlimited
right of manipulation, in that the sampler could alter the sound in
any conceivable manner, now or hereafter known, and make it a
part of any musical arrangement. Thus, one could sample a saxo-
phone riff and use digital technology to rearrange and alter it in
217. Milli Vanilli, for example, was virtually laughed out of the music business when it
was revealed that the pair neither wrote nor orally performed any of the music they danced
around to.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 224-37 for suggestions on fee setting.
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such a way as to effectively create an entirely new saxophone
composition.
2. The Primary Purpose Requirement. - One would be per-
mitted to use only the compulsory license if one's primary purpose
was to distribute nondramatic musical phonorecords embodying
the sample to the public for private use.
3. Notice Requirements. - The person seeking to use the
compulsory license would have to serve219 upon the copyright
owner of the sound recording a Notice of Intention to Obtain a
Compulsory License for the Use of a Sample in Making and Dis-
tributing Phonorecords. 2 0 Like the mechanical compulsory license,
the "amount of information required [would be] rather extensive
and [would] undoubtedly discourage the use of the compulsory li-
cense procedure. 2 21 If the compulsory license were law, however,
people would be forced to either negotiate the use of the sample or
face this procedure.
4. Payment. - Each phonorecord distributed to the public
that embodies the sample would require payment of the compul-
sory license fee.
222
5. Statements and Payments. - All phonorecords distributed
that embody the sample would require making payments and pro-
viding royalty statements on a monthly basis.2 23 An annual state-
ment of accounting would also be required. For this proposal,
quarterly payments were considered because of their comparative
ease for the smaller companies that typically represent the sam-
pler. That idea was rejected, however, because it would lead to the
inequitable result that a sampler would be able to earn greater in-
terest on the unpaid royalties than if monthly payments were re-
quired. Samplers, as digital pirates, would benefit enough by a
compulsory license legalizing sampling.
6. The Fee. - As with other compulsory licenses, the fee
219. For specifications on proper service of the Notice for the mechanical compulsory
license, see ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5.03[C][2][b]. The Notice for samples would be sub-
stantially the same.
220. This is similar to the designation provided for by 37 C.F.R. § 201.18(c) in refer-
ence to the mechanical compulsory license.
221. ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5.03[C][2][b]. For specifications on the contents of the
current Notice of Intention for a mechanical compulsory license, see ABRAMS at
5.03[C1[2][b][iJ, and 37 C.F.R. § 201.18(d).
222. See ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5.03[C][2][c], for a discussion on determining
when a phonorecord is "distributed," as opposed to merely manufactured, and the account-
ing problems therein.
223. See ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5.03[C][2][e][iii].
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would be established by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.2 4 The
fee would consist of a base fee and a charge by the second
(rounded off) for each sample used. Keeping in mind the rate
guidelines under the Act,2 ' this proposal's suggestion is that the
flat rate be .25 cents (1 cent) per distributed phonorecord, and an
additional cent for each second of the sample's playing time in the
original work; thus, samplers would pay for what they take, not for
how the sample is used. For example, one could sample a two sec-
ond drum riff and manipulate it to become a five minute drum
track, but the sampler would only pay for the length of the original
sample-two seconds. The base fee's purpose is to place a clear
and predictable standard for minimal samples that are one second
or less in duration. The purpose of an increasing payment schedule
(an additional cent for each second of the original sample's playing
time) is to place an artificial cap on the taking of lengthy samples.
These fees are just suggestions, however, and the determination of
a rate is best left to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. The primary
considerations should be a balancing between the reality that some
artists use dozens of samples and the desire to limit the length of a
single sample to a short duration.
A critical issue is who gets paid. Common music industry prac-
tice is to pay both the owner of the sound recording and the owner
of the underlying composition for the use of a sample.2 6 Most
often, the record company that produces the sound recording has
exclusive rights to it,227 and the artist retains the composition
rights. Only the owner of the sound recording, and not the owner
of the underlying composition, should be paid for the use of
samples.
224. Section 801 of the Act establishes the Tribunal and defines its purpose. It states
that royalty rates for compulsory licenses shall be calculated to achieve four objectives:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public;
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the
copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions;
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in
the product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contri-
bution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribu-
tion to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their
communication;
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries in-
volved and on generally prevailing industry practices.
The current royalty rate for a mechanical compulsory license is 6.25 cents per album distrib-
uted or 1.2 cents per minute of playing time, whichever is greater.
225. Supra note 224.
226. Browne, supra note 193.
227. ENTERTAINMENT LAW 18 (Howard Seigel, ed. 1989).
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Most samples do not conflict with the composition because
they are either too short to be copyrightable on their own, 28 are
altered unrecognizably, or are simply not distinctive enough for a
jury to find that the sampled work is substantially similar to the
original.2 9 The real piracy concern that sampling presents is with
sound recordings, not compositions. Regardless, a compelling and
logical argument can be made that sampling does not violate com-
position rights at all. The copyrights in a composition and a given
sound recording are distinct. Because the composition owner has
no claim on the duplication of that specific sound recording, in
which the record company generally owns the exclusive rights, the
rights of the composition owner cannot be infringed by a work that
duplicates a piece of that sound recording. Clearly, only the owner
of the sound recording sampled from deserves to be paid for that
sampling.5 0
Some may criticize this fee proposal. One argument is that all
rates set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal are arbitrary.231 The
clarity and predictability of a compulsory license standard, how-
ever, far outweigh this arbitrariness criticism. The market "value"
of all things is of necessity vague, because it always revolves
around generalities of what one is willing to pay, and because
money is itself an artificial construct.
Another criticism is that a set royalty ignores the individual
talents and fame of the artist sampled from. If the sampled sounds
are truly appealing, however, it will result in increased sales and
the owner of the sampled sound recording will be compensated ac-
cordingly; if the sample is not that distinctive, yet the album sells
well, it is an added windfall for the owner of the sampled record-
ing; and if the new album does not sell well, no harm is done to
either party. In addition, a set fee is far better than getting poten-
tially zero compensation under today's ambiguous industry prac-
228. It should be noted that very small takings which are the "hook" of the original
song have been held to infringe the composition copyright, based on a substantial similarity
standard. In Boosey v. Empire Music Co., for example, a mere six notes were held to in-
fringe another's composition copyright. 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). This was a case of
merely copying the composition, however, and not a case of duplicating the sound recording.
229. The standard for whether one musical work infringes the rights of another is
whether it is "substantially similar" to the other work. See supra text accompanying notes
129-56 for a discussion of this standard.
230. Note that if the rest of the new work, excluding the sample, was substantially
similar to the original sampled-from work, it would infringe the composition copyright.
231. Paul S. Rosenlund, Note, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Compositions for
Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 698-702 (1979) (mar-
ket analysis and criticism of the royalty rate).
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tices. A set fee is therefore an equitable solution.
One could also argue that some samples, such as a peep or
even several notes, are too de minimis to justify a statutory fee. All
sound recording performances, however, are unique artistic expres-
sions,232 wholly separate from unprotectable ideas, and deserve
compensation for that reason alone. In addition, music industry
personnel would probably grant free licenses for any use they
deemed trivial, because this use would be to everyone's benefit in
terms of good will, money, time, and hassle avoidance. Industry
personnel have stated they are unlikely to press their rights unless
a sample embodies an essential element of the original recording.233
Thus, a simple phone call would probably clear, gratis, any de
minimis sample.
The ultimate justification for fixing a statutory payment
scheme is the general accord in the industry that sampling should
be compensable. 234 "To appropriate the creative endeavors of an-
other and use them for personal gain without compensation. . . is
manifestly unfair. ' 23 5 "No social purpose is served by having [one]
get free some aspect of [another's] that would have market value
and for which he would normally pay. '23 6 Jay Morgenstern, Execu-
tive Vice President and General Manager of music publishing giant
Warner-Chapper Music, has no objections to sampling, but thinks
"if you're going to use somebody else's material, you should pay
them a fair amount for it.")
237
7. Termination of the Compulsory License. - If statements
and payments were unreasonably overdue, the license would
terminate.23 s
8. Label Credit. - A label credit would be an important re-
quirement of the compulsory license for each sampled piece. One
would be required to specify the song the sample is used in and the
instrument or other sound the sample is composed of, and note the
album, song, and artist from which it was derived. This would en-
sure recognition of true talent. A major dilemma with sampling is
that it is deceitful. For example, as one author describes, consum-
232. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
233. Broussard, supra note 131, at 494.
234. This is evidenced by industry practices. See supra text accompanying notes 201-
02.
235. Moglovkin, supra note 50, at 164.
236. Id. at 167, citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576
(1977).
237. Horn, supra note 136.
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ers hearing the Beastie Boys' song, "She's Crafty," will think they
are fantastic guitarists, when in reality the guitar riff is a sample
taken from Jimmy Page off the Led Zeppelin song, "The Ocean."
Imagine their surprise when they attend their first Beastie Boys'
concert and learn that all the music is pre-recorded and none of
the Beastie Boys are musicians.
9. Rights of the Sampler. - The sampling artist would have
composition and sound recording rights in the new recording be-
cause the new work would presumably satisfy the copyright re-
quirements for an original work of authorship.
10. An Amendment to the Copyright Act. - Separate from
the compulsory license for samples, Congress should enact an
amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act that would confer statutory
copyright protection to pre-February 15, 1972, sound recordings.
As detailed earlier in this Comment, this vast exclusion of works
from protection under the Act is unjustified and was the result of
legislative error, not intent.2 40 Further, this amendment would be
necessary to confer the same scope of protection to all copyright-
able sound recordings and provide for the same remedies.
2 4'1
11. Prohibition on Combining with a Mechanical Compulsory
License. - One using a mechanical compulsory license would be
prohibited from using a compulsory license for samples for the
same song. This restriction is necessary in order to limit the
amount of original sound that one can take from any single source.
For example, if an artist obtained a mechanical license to record
the Bob Marley song "Jamming," the artist would be prohibited
from using any samples from a recording of that song.
12. Retroactivity. - This provision would not be retroactive,
meaning it would not apply to sound recordings using unautho-
rized samples that have already been produced. Providing for ret-
roactivity would be unworkable and unduly burdensome for all in-
volved parties, and open the litigation floodgates.
C. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Compulsory
License
242
One could argue against a compulsory license for samples on
239. Thorn, supra note 7, at 332, n.159.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
241. The Act provides for: statutory damages and profits, § 504; costs and attorney's
fees, § 505; and criminal prosecution, § 506.
242. See Scott L. Bach, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses: To-
ward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 379-81, for a criticism of the
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the grounds that a previous consideration of a compulsory license
for sound recordings was emphatically rejected. 243 This rejection,
however, was aimed at only a license that would have granted the
right to copy entire sound recordings, and was expressed at a time
when digital sampling technology had not yet invaded the music
scene. Further, those using a sample must still invest their own
time, effort, and money into developing and promoting their own
album, unlike traditional pirates of entire sound recordings.
Another criticism of the compulsory license could be that it
chips away at the already limited rights that a sound recording
copyright confers. Limiting rights in this instance, however, is no
different from any of the other compulsory licenses. By requiring
compensation for the samples, the sound recording owner is not
damaged economically because any indirect damage is offset
through the compensation. Further, Congress can enact any legis-
lation that best promotes the arts, and a compulsory license for
sampling would do just that.24
A third argument against the adoption of a compulsory license
for samples could be that sampling dilutes the value of the original
artist's work because it takes one's "signature sound. 2 45 It is
doubtful, however, that consumers are able to identify most sam-
ples with the original performer's recording, and when they are
able to do so, it is difficult to see where any harm might result
from that association. Further, recognizable "hook" samples, if
anything, probably enhance the value of the original work. This
license proposal would open a new market for artists' sounds and
calls for adequate compensation so that any dilution in value
would be offset. In short, the "societal interest in new artworks"
weighs in favor of a compulsory license, because the copyright
holder of the original work "loses little by the [use]. 246
A fourth argument against a compulsory license for sampling
could be that there is moral harm done to musicians who are com-
pelled to license a piece of their work for use in exceedingly porno-
mechanical license.
243. Giannini, supra note 44, at 515, citing H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
The Committee found no justification for granting a compulsory license for sound record-
ings, because sound recordings are developed and promoted by others, and one should not
be allowed to freely exploit the talent, time and money of another. Mechanical compulsory
licenses are distinguishable, however, because one must invest one's own time, money, and
talent, by independently developing and promoting one's own recorded version of a
composition.
244. Supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
245. See Am, supra note 17, at 62.
246. Keyt, supra note 130 at 461.
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graphic or violent music.24 7 Admittedly, this is a legitimate con-
cern. Most pornographic or violent music, however, gains limited
exposure, so there would rarely be any real harm. Further, one can
argue that the rare occasions where real moral harm could result
are insignificant in comparison to the huge benefits that a compul-
sory license could provide. Also, because the proposed license is
limited to a single sample for each artist or group sampled from for
each new album, any harm would be minimal.
A final potential argument against the compulsory license pro-
posal is of a practical nature: There is an entire profession of pro-
grammers who have each compiled extensive libraries of samples,
many of which may be untraceable to the original owner, depend-
ing on whether the programmer keeps records of his sampling.
This problem, however, should not be a bar to enacting legislation
that would enforce the rights of those being sampled. Moreover,
because programmers generally sample highly distinctive sounds,
they will frequently remember where many of them came from, es-
pecially because samples of famous or highly distinctive sounding
artists are of particular prestige to the programmer. If this propo-
sal were enacted, samplers would be on notice to keep accurate
records of their sampling activities.
D. Justifications for the Proposal
A compulsory license for samples would replace the ad hoc
hassles and confusion of current industry practices and ambiguous
law by setting clear, definable standards for the use of samples. A
compulsory license would promote the arts248 better than the cur-
rent situation because it would limit the production costs, legal
fees, and settlements inherent in current industry practices,
thereby allowing genres such as rap and pop to continue to utilize
sampling technology as an artistic tool and further develop. This
license would best serve the public good by encouraging alternative
forms of creative expression, yet at the same time protect the
rights of sound recording owners by ensuring compensation for any
use. As with the mechanical compulsory license, it "encourage[s]
different [musical] arrangements . . . while still providing fair
compensation to the original artist."249 A compulsory license thus
247. See Broussard, supra note 131, at 497, which notes that many industry figures
express an unwillingness to license samples for use in such works.
248. See Moglovkin, supra note 50, at 162, which states that protection of samples
would "encourag[e] creativity."
249. Fishman, supra note 15, at 218. This was the Congressional intent behind the
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balances the piracy-artistry dichotomy.
A compulsory license would solve many of the practical dilem-
mas faced by the music industry as a result of sampling. First, it
would negate the devastating situation where an artist seeks clear-
ance after producing an album containing a sample, but is denied
permission; the artist is then faced with either scrapping the entire
project or risking a potential multi-million dollar law suit if he re-
leases the album. That situation was faced by Terminator X, the
DJ for the platinum-selling rap group Public Enemy. He chose the
latter route and was hit with a $500,000 law suit.25 0 A compulsory
license would recognize the artistic truth that many musicians use
the work of others in the heat of inspiration, and hence fail to seek
permission until after a work is created. Also, "[m]any performers
in the music industry [simply] do not understand the legal and
technical ramifications of the burgeoning new art form of digital
sampling, 251 and "release albums with unauthorized samples in
hopes that a legal or financial settlement will be reached later."
25
The compulsory license, because it would spread out payments
from the royalty pool, would allow artists to use samples even
though they might not have otherwise had the money to clear sam-
ples in flat fee buyouts.
The compulsory license would also end most piracy by affirm-
atively setting in the Copyright Act the standard that all unautho-
rized sampling or other method of sound recording duplication vio-
lates one's rights in the sound *recording. Thus, the license would
facilitate negotiation and simplify deals by setting a standard from
which to work. Lawyers would not need to quarrel over arbitrary
quantitative and qualitative analyses of each sample's worth, be-
cause the compulsory license would set the payment standard. The
license would therefore save time and money, discourage litigation,
and foster a more cooperative atmosphere.
Because the compulsory license would require compensation
for samples, it would reinstate a value on musicians with unique
sounds and on session musicians. Depending on the project, one
may wish to pay a live musician a flat fee for a brief studio session
rather than face the specifications of the compulsory license or risk
mechanical compulsory license.
250. Terminator X sought permission from Bridgeport Music to sample from "Body
Language," a song co-written by funk superstar George Clinton. When Bridgeport refused,
Terminator X released his debut solo album anyway, sample included. Janine McAdams,
New Sampling Suit Targets Terminator X, BrusoARD, Feb. 15, 1992, at 12.
251. Marcus, supra note 110, at 768.
252. Browne, supra note 193.
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a lawsuit with an unauthorized sample, a suit that one would be
certain to lose under the proposed license provision. In addition,
the uses of sampling that are now "free"-all the disguised, undis-
tinctive, and de minimis samples-would require compensation
under the license. Hopefully, as a result of reasonable compensa-
tion, the compulsory license would also help to encourage true ar-
tistry and discourage all the "filth"26 3 and "monoton[y]"2 '' that
has pervaded popular music in the last decade.
The primary effect of the compulsory license would be to facil-
itate negotiation. "[C]ompulsory licenses [have] motivated the ne-
gotiations that have occurred" and for that reason alone have
proved highly useful.266 The royalty rate of the license sets a stan-
dard on which to base negotiation. Thus, the compulsory license
for samples would be like the current mechanical compulsory li-
cense that is rarely if ever invoked by major record companies be-
cause of the burden of monthly statements and payments, and an-
nual certified statements. "The existence of compulsory license
rates, however, substantially controls the basic pattern in which
the recording industry does business with the music publishing
industry."2"
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed compulsory license for samples is in line with
the Constitutional purpose behind copyright law of promoting the
arts. The proposed license is also in harmony with notions of fair-
ness that people should be duly compensated for their unique tal-
ents and labor where another seeks to exploit them for financial
gain. The license would balance the artistry-piracy dichotomy and
solve the current legal and music industry dilemmas of uncer-
tainty, ambiguity, and needless expense, time and hassle, by set-
ting a clear, predictable standard.
253. Moira McCormick, Where is Rap Heading, BILLBOARD, Nov. 23, 1991, at R-3.
254. BILLBOARD, Oct. 26, 1991, at 82.
255. Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will it Survive in a Changing
Marketplace?, 5 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 37, 48 (1986) (conveying the usefulness of com-
pulsory licenses).
256. ABRAMs, supra note 98, at 5.03[C][2][g] (discussing the effects of the mechanical
compulsory license on music industry practices).
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